By Kaushal
As India moves to finalise an $8 billion deal with Germany for advanced submarines, the agreement marks a significant expansion of defence cooperation between the two countries. In recent years, India and Germany have signed multiple defence and security
understandings covering naval platforms, maritime domain awareness, technology collaboration, and defence manufacturing. At the same time, Germany’s legal framework allows dual citizenship under defined conditions, including for foreign nationals of Pakistani origin. Security analysts
caution that while such arrangements are a routine feature of open democracies, they can introduce counter-intelligence complexities when sensitive military programs intersect with states that have a
documented history of leveraging overseas diaspora networks for intelligence collection and influence operations.
Against this backdrop, experts are raising concerns about potential espionage vulnerabilities linked to Pakistan’s extensive diaspora presence in Europe. Analysts say dual citizenship can provide legal mobility and access that may be exploited to monitor, influence, or indirectly gather information
related to high-value defence programs, including those central to India’s naval modernisation.
“Dual citizenship offers a legal and logistical bridge,” said a former European intelligence official who requested anonymity. “Individuals with enduring ties to Pakistan can live and work in Germany while maintaining access to networks back home. That creates opportunities for intelligence collection, influence operations, and, in some cases, technology diversion.”
Diaspora Networks and Military Espionage
Historical precedent underscores the concern. The most prominent example remains the A.Q. Khannetwork, in which a Pakistani scientist working in the Netherlands during the 1970s illicitly removed classified gas-centrifuge designs used for uranium enrichment. Dutch intelligence later confirmed that Khan copied sensitive blueprints while employed at a European nuclear consortium.
Those stolen designs enabled Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, fundamentally altering South Asia’s strategic balance. International investigations later established that the same technology was
proliferated onward to Iran, Libya, and North Korea, making the episode one of the largest military-technology thefts in modern history. Security analysts say the case illustrates how diaspora access and foreign residency can be exploited to extract and redistribute strategic secrets.
Similar patterns have since been observed in the conventional military domain. Pakistan has been linked to efforts to acquire Western avionics, radar systems, and naval technologies through overseas access points. In France, authorities flagged attempts by Pakistani operatives to obtain
submarine combat-system data during the Agosta-90B procurement process, prompting tighter export controls and enhanced end-use monitoring. NATO intelligence assessments have also warned
about the exposure of sensitive military systems through indirect access routes involving nonmember
states.
Expanding the Threat: China and Turkey
Western defense analysts note that Pakistan has leveraged strategic partnerships to reverse-engineer or transfer sensitive technology. In multiple cases, Pakistan facilitated Chinese access to U.S.-origin military systems, including avionics and missile-guidance components acquired through licensed programs. U.S. officials described these transfers as technology diversion, leading to strictermonitoring of Pakistan’s access to advanced defence equipment.
Concerns have also emerged over Turkey–Pakistan intelligence and military cooperation. Pakistan’s engagement with Turkish defence institutions has provided indirect exposure to NATOgradesystems, raising alarms within alliance circles about unauthorised access, replication, or
onward transfer of sensitive information. Analysts say such cooperation, while formally legal, cancreate grey zones that complicate counter-intelligence safeguards.
The German Connection
Germany, home to one of Europe’s larger Pakistani diaspora communities, plays a central role in India’s submarine acquisition. Security specialists say dual nationals or long-term residents with ties to Pakistan could potentially:
- Gather intelligence on submarine supply chains and industrial processes
- Leverage professional or technical access to sensitive documentation
- Support indirect surveillance, recruitment, or influence efforts targeting personnel associated with the program
While no public cases have directly linked Pakistani dual citizens in Germany to espionage against Indian defence projects, European authorities point to a broader historical pattern in which expatriate networks have been used for intelligence collection, financial transfers, and covert influence activities.
Lessons from the Past
A series of past cases continue to inform current assessments: - Brigadier Raja Rizwan Haider, a senior Pakistani officer, was convicted by a militarycourt for leaking sensitive nuclear-related information, highlighting vulnerabilities within Pakistan’s own security establishment.
- Colonel Shahid Bashir was courtmartialed for leaking operational details of a strategic airbase, underscoring the risks posed by insider access.
- The Agosta submarine episode in France demonstrated how procurement processes can be exploited for intelligence gathering.
- Pakistan–China reverse-engineering efforts show how diverted Western technology can be replicated for strategic advantage.
- Turkey–Pakistan intelligence collaboration illustrates the counter-intelligence challenges posed by indirect access to NATO-grade systems.
“Espionage today is rarely about a single breach,” said Dr. Karen Fischer, a security analyst at the European Center for Strategic Studies. “It is usually systemic — combining diaspora access, dual citizenship, procurement relationships, and international partnerships.”
Balancing