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Analyzing Shortcomings in Pakistan Army’s Multi-Domain Ops Video: Ex Raad Ul Fatah

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This is an examination of Pakistan Army’s most recent promotional video on Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) as part of Exercise Raad Ul Fatah. As per Pakistan Army, this exercise ostensibly aimed to showcase the Pak army’s capabilities in integrating various operational domains to achieve strategic objectives. However, the video has drawn scrutiny for several apparent inconsistencies and tactical oversights, which undermine its intended message.

Ideally, Multi-Domain Operations emphasize the seamless coordination across land, air, sea, space, cyber, and even nuclear domains to dominate adversaries in contested environments. Yet, the video primarily focuses on land and air components, omitting maritime, nuclear, and other critical domains. This narrow scope raises questions about the exercise’s alignment with true MDO doctrine, which requires holistic integration to address modern warfare’s complexities.

The production quality of the visuals also warrants attention. Described as amateurish, the footage and graphics lack the polish expected from official military communications, potentially diminishing the credibility of the demonstrated capabilities.

A prominent feature in the video is the Pakistan Army’s dependence on satellite imagery for real-time intelligence. This prompts inquiries into the ownership and availability of such assets. Speculation points to potential reliance on Chinese satellites, which may be preoccupied with countering U.S. activities in the region. Such dependencies could compromise operational independence and highlight vulnerabilities in space-domain integration, a cornerstone of effective MDO.

Further examination reveals tactical lapses in the portrayed scenarios. For instance, soldiers are shown advancing into combat without essential protective gear, such as helmets—a fundamental breach of standard operating procedures that could expose personnel to unnecessary risks.

The war-gaming elements assume an adversarial force, presumably the Indian Army, has already seized territory, as indicated by the graphics. This premise suggests a reactive rather than proactive stance, that itself tells us about the paucity of confidence Pakistan Army has in itself when it comes to defending their soil.

Several sequences depict armored units in ways that appear tactically unsound. Pakistani tanks are shown traversing vast open plains without apparent opposition, an unrealistic portrayal that overlooks the challenges of contested terrain in real-world conflicts.

More critically, the tanks are not maneuvering in proper formations, representing a significant operational blunder. Coordinated formations are essential for mutual support, fire distribution, and survivability in MDO environments.

Additionally, the video illustrates tanks engaging targets from elevated positions. While this might offer a vantage point for observation, it exposes the vehicles to direct enemy fire, contravening basic principles of concealment and cover. Such positioning could invite rapid countermeasures from opposing forces, further illustrating gaps in tactical execution.

This video emerges in the context of recent remarks by Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi on advancing Multi-Domain Operations. India’s Bhairav Battalions, specialized units designed for MDO, exemplify a focused approach to integrating diverse domains for enhanced battlefield effectiveness. In contrast, the Pakistan Army’s presentation has been critiqued as underdeveloped, with a narrative that lacks the sophistication needed to convincingly address these advancements.

Ultimately, the video’s shortcomings may inadvertently reveal areas for improvement in Pakistan’s MDO framework. As a wise observer once noted, “Do not interrupt when your enemy is making mistakes.”

For Pakistani military professionals, this serves as a reminder of the importance of rigorous, realistic simulations in preparing for the multifaceted demands of modern warfare. If they’re not prepared, Op Sindoor 2.0 would be more shocking to them than its first iteration.

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