pic credit: IndianStrategicknowledgeonline
We are reposting a report posted by MEA, India on Operation Sarp Vinash carried out by Indian Defence Forces in Kashmir between April-May 2003, which killed 64 terrorists. The report covers outcomes and the lessons learnt.
Time to Terrorise the Terrorists
While infiltration may be looking down, acts of terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir have not subsided. This will only happen once the swamps and pits of terrorist infrastructure have been dried and destroyed, permanently and irreversibly. This is easier said than done. The Indian Army early this month launched one of its biggest terrorist hunting operations in recent times in the Surankote forests in a place called Hilkaka on the southeastern slopes of the Pir Panjal range which separates Srinagar valley from Jammu. In the old days, in summer, the Mughal caravans from Delhi would cross over the Pir Panjal pass into Srinagar.
Operation Sarp Vinash was a division-size operation involving seven battalions and two brigade headquarters. Spearheaded by the 9 Para Special Forces, six other units of the 163 Infantry Brigade and 12 RR sector took part. These were 2/4 Gorkha Rifles, 15 Garhwal Rifles, 4 Garhwal Rifles, 16 and 20 Rashtriya Rifles. It is estimated that up to 100 terrorists were in and around the Hilkaka hideout, spread out in the forest when Special Forces struck in the initial raid. They gunned down 13 terrorists and captured two of whom one died later.
In subsequent combing operations which lasted 10 days, 4 Garhwal Rifles ambushed seven terrorists near Haripur while they were attempting to cross over into Srinagar. Altogether, 45 terrorists were killed against a loss of four soldiers killed and two wounded. Substantial recoveries were made. Approximately 60 caches and hideouts were busted, yielding 20 AK-47 rifles, five PIKA guns, two sniper rifles and unspecified quantities of grenade launchers, self-loading rifles and 45 kg of plastic explosives. In addition, substantial quantities of radio sets and other communications equipment were also recovered, besides rations enough to feed 500 men for two weeks.
How important and successful the operation was can be judged from the fact that the Chief of Army Staff, Gen NC Vij, flew into the area of operations and congratulated the troops on an excellent job. It is very difficult to stage-manage largescale counter-terrorist operations, as the movement of troops compromises operational security. Many more similar operations need to be conducted in order to keep the terrorists on the run. But these have to be based on hard intelligence and properly staged. The Indian Army has done enough of jungle-bashing in the past.
Op Sarp Vinash would not have been possible without hard intelligence and tactical airlift. Three MI 17 helipads were constructed for logistics, quick relocation of troops and maintaining the integrity of the cordon and stops around Hilkaka. In a striking departure from past practice, Army Aviation Lancer attack helicopters were used. The army rarely uses helicopters in an attack role in counter-insurgency operations in J&K and elsewhere in the country. Field commanders have not wished to escalate the conflict by employing gunships that, due to visibility constraints, cause collateral damage.
Lancer attack Helicopter
The only time the Air Force was employed against CIS was in Mizoram in 1964, when rebels had seized Aizawl and captured an Assam Rifles post. French Ouragan attack aircraft were used to assist the army in its operations. IAF helicopters were also used extensively in attack mode against the LTTE in Sri Lanka.
It has puzzled many counter-terrorism experts as to why the Indian Army has been reluctant to use the attack helicopter, especially when dealing with terrorist camps in the uninhabited jungle hideouts of mountain ranges. Both the army and the air force have fitted an impressive array of direct firing weapons and cannons on the helicopters for flushing out and suppressive fire operations. These need to be used more frequently, but selectively.
Op Sarp Vinash shows that, while infiltration in J&K and into the Valley is continuing, counter-infiltration and counter-terrorist operations are also in full swing but not with the intensity and continuity required to deter and punish the terrorists. It is possible to considerably reduce the lifespan of a terrorist-first, at the stage of infiltration, second while he is staging through (as in Hilkaka) and, finally, as he goes about his business of terrorising the people of J&K.
It is also feasible to turn the tables by terrorising the terrorist. The resources and wherewithal can be mustered, but political will and stamina are lacking. A strategy reconciling winning hearts and minds and reducing alienation with punitive operations against terrorists can seriously alter the balance of advantage in favour of the state. But conditions apply: Centralised command and non-interference in operations.
At present, at any time there are in J&K around 3,000 to 3,500 terrorists, 80 per cent mainly foreigners. Pakistan spends roughly Rs 80 crore to maintain this force. Another 2,000 terrorists are waiting across the Line of Control at launchpads and training camps to be inducted in the pipeline to maintain the force levels. This costs another Rs 20 crore. On an average, nearly 12 to 1,400 terrorists are disposed of to meet their maker every year.
Approximately 200 to 250 army personnel are killed annually in counter-terrorist operations (this does not include the wounded). About twice that number of paramilitary forces lose their lives. The civilian losses are even more, equalling the combined casualty of the security forces. These are horrendous numbers and reflect the very low value index on human life in the country.
While the political process with Pakistan and the people of Kashmir must never be halted, the Indian state must think anew ways of defeating terrorists and not letting Pakistan succeed in its bleeding war in which the military casualties suffered by security forces in the 15-year long proxy war have exceeded the losses incurred in all the wars India has fought against Pakistan since 1947. The social, human and economic cost of this war has never been calculated and must run in billions of crores.
As the Indian state has not had the stomach to get to the roots and swamps of terrorism across the LoC, it can surely raise the cost of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism on its side of the LoC. The kill rate of terrorists vis-a-vis the army must be enhanced from the present 1:7 (it becomes 1:5 including other security forces) to 1:9, and similarly better results sought from paramilitary forces. The army is doing a very difficult job with commendable achievements. But this proxy war has been going on for too long. It wants it ended.
Messers LK Advani, George Fernandes and Mufti Mohammad Sayeed need to sit with military commanders and intelligence chiefs to establish an operationally effective unified command headquarters to replace the halfcock in vogue in order to persecute this war. The sense one gets is that the political leadership is not serious about fighting this war despite the routine threats to do so.
National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra recently called for an axis of counter-terrorism between India, Israel and the US to root out the evil without getting bogged down with the root causes or definitions. Let India first demonstrate resolve and determination in J&K. We have five Special Force battalions. This number must be quadrupled by the end of next year under a new Special Forces command. The war in Iraq was won by Special Forces. They must be equipped by the best men and equipment, given a clear mandate for operations in J&K under the overall command of Northern Army Commander in Udhampur. This gentleman must be appointed the overall theatre commander to fight the proxy war. Given the latest intelligence, hi-tech equipment and Delhi’s full backing, he will begin delivering enhanced results.
It is possible in two years’ time to bring down the figure of exported terrorists to half, reduce their gene pool from 3,000 to 2,000 and abridge their longevity. In five years the terrorists should be down on their knees. We have wasted the last 15 years not getting on top of the scourge. Even now it is not too late to terrorise the terrorists.