Negotiations between Pakistan’s military and China over the future use of Gwadar, a strategic port city, have reached an impasse due to Islamabad’s significant demands for economic and military support, including the provision of a second-strike nuclear capability. This request, if fulfilled, would mark a major enhancement of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence strategy.

A second-strike capability is a cornerstone of nuclear deterrence, enabling a country to retaliate even if its nuclear arsenal suffers a crippling first-strike attack. This form of deterrence typically involves survivable systems such as nuclear-armed submarines or heavily fortified missile silos. Countries possessing such capabilities dramatically increase the cost of a potential nuclear conflict, ensuring that adversaries are deterred from launching a preemptive strike.

Currently, only a select group of nuclear powers—including the United States, Russia, China, and potentially India—maintains robust second-strike capabilities.India has developed this capability through its Arihant-class SSBNs, which carry the K-4 and K-15 ballistic missiles. China’s nuclear doctrine includes advanced submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carried by its Jin-class submarines and road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) designed to ensure survivability in a conflict.

Pakistan, which relies primarily on land-based nuclear delivery systems and tactical nuclear weapons (tac-nukes), has sought to enhance its deterrence posture, especially against India. However, second-strike capability would represent a quantum leap in its strategic capabilities, requiring technological, logistical, and operational advancements.

Gwadar and Strategic Disputes

Gwadar, located on Pakistan’s southwestern coast, is a linchpin in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and a potential hub for dual-use military and commercial activities. Classified documents reportedly reveal Pakistan’s private assurances to China about transforming Gwadar into a permanent military base. However, public protests and backlash over China’s demand for a military foothold, coupled with Pakistan’s request for sweeping concessions, have derailed negotiations.

China’s refusal to provide second-strike technology brings to fore the strategic sensitivity of such a transfer. Albeit, there are no official confirmations to this other than what a website called Dropsite published recently. While Beijing has invested heavily in Pakistan’s infrastructure and economy, it has drawn a clear line on military technology sharing that could provoke international condemnation and destabilize regional power dynamics.

The stalled talks come amid Pakistan’s deepening economic and political crises, including widespread protests over a failing economy, accusations of election manipulation, and the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. While China has long been viewed as a key economic and strategic ally, recent tensions suggest the relationship is under significant strain.

The strategic impasse also highlights diverging priorities: China seeks to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean and secure its investments, while Pakistan is attempting to leverage Gwadar for both economic relief and strategic military advantages.

Comparative Nuclear Capabilities: China and Pakistan

• China: With a nuclear arsenal estimated at over 400 warheads, China’s strength lies in its second-strike capabilities, particularly its fleet of Jin-class submarines equipped with JL-2 SLBMs. China also deploys road-mobile DF-31 and DF-41 ICBMs, providing survivability against first strikes. The Pentagon report estimates that it has added about 100 nuclear warheads since last year, bringing its stockpile to more than 600 by mid-2024. That is still much smaller than the arsenals of the United States and Russia, but China appears to be on track to deploy more than 1,000 warheads by 2030, the report said
• Pakistan: Pakistan’s estimated 170 nuclear warheads rely on land-based delivery systems, including Shaheen and Ghauri ballistic missiles, as well as tactical nuclear weapons like the NASR missile. Pakistan lacks the sophisticated submarine-based delivery systems necessary for a credible second-strike capability.

The stalled negotiations are part of the Consultation on Strategic Defense and Security Cooperation, also known as the 2+2 Dialogue. Previous meetings in Beijing, Urumqi, and Islamabad have addressed military cooperation and regional security. However, the current breakdown underscores a widening rift between the two allies.

Unless both sides find common ground, the future of Gwadar’s militarization and the broader Sino-Pakistani strategic partnership remains uncertain. This standoff reflects broader challenges in balancing national security, regional stability, and international scrutiny in an era of shifting geopolitical alliances.