The above pic is location of lesser known Chinese PLA’s EW unit in Tibet, outside Lhasa.

The Tibet Military District, a component of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force, was originally formed in 1952, possibly incorporating units from the former 18th Corps. In December 1968, it became part of the Chengdu Military Region.

Previously known as the Tibet Military Region, it was downgraded to a military district in 1971. However, during the 2016 military reforms, the district was upgraded to a sub-Theater grade command, allowing it to operate with partial independence from the Western Theater Command’s jurisdiction.

The above picture shows 7th Electronic Countermeasures Brigade of PLA. The pictures are atleast 2 years old as per Google Earth.

According to available details, the Fourth Department (4PLA) of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department (GSD), also referred to as the Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department, was responsible for overseeing the PLA’s offensive electronic warfare (EW) and information warfare (IW) operations, including offensive cyber activities. In 2016, these responsibilities were reassigned to the Network Systems Department under the PLA Strategic Support Force.

The People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force served as a branch of the Chinese military from December 2015 until April 2024.

To enhance the military’s capacity to engage in what China refers to as “informationized warfare” and strengthen the PLA’s ability to project power in space and cyberspace, the PLASSF was established as a force aimed at dismantling silos within intelligence-sharing and coordination mechanisms across various branches.

On April 19, 2024, the Strategic Support Force was disbanded and divided into three distinct entities: the People’s Liberation Army Aerospace Force, the People’s Liberation Army Cyberspace Force, and the People’s Liberation Army Information Support Force. These units focus on supporting the development and utilization of network information systems.

PLA EW doctrine:

PLAA doctrine places great emphasis on the capable deployment of EW assets at tactical
echelons, viewing them as both key enablers for the fight in the information domain and key defenders of critical battlefield assets. The PLA categorizes EW operations under the umbrella of information operations (IO), a blanket term that encompasses
many different battlefield activities all focused on winning the fight in the information domain. Through a mix of information attack and information defense, the PLA intends to achieve information superiority over its opponents. EW assets contribute to both the information attack and information defense missions, underpinning the PLA’s idea of synthesis: the idea that all IO operations should be linked, deconflicted, and mutually supporting.
(U) The CA-BDE’s EW missions are radio frequency (RF) communications jamming, radio direction finding (RDF), precision-guided munitions (PGM) jamming, and sensor neutralization. The CA-BDE’s EW assets focus primarily on disrupting the enemy’s tactical communications – particularly those passed over-the-air; defeating enemy firepower systems either through disrupting munitions or disrupting enemy ISR/targeting; and locating valuable enemy targets through RDF.
(U) The PLAA’s employment of its EW assets follows the doctrinal principal of high-value targets. Rather than employing EW assets indiscriminately across a wide area, the PLAA seeks to target specific high-value assets and messages, while ignoring or allowing lower-value assets to operate normally. This precludes the enemy detecting and responding to an EW attack before it can be of most value to the PLAA commander.