Article by Shree Kumar Menon

Narcotics investigations are complex operations that require extensive collaboration between various law enforcement agencies and organizations. Criminals no longer rely solely on traditional methods, such as the use of carriers or “mules,” business fronts, or other structures common in traditional trafficking hierarchies. Clandestine internet markets, encrypted messaging apps, and cryptocurrencies are the latest trends, allowing traffickers to operate more efficiently, on a global scale, and with greater anonymity. This shift has given rise to new investigative methods and tools for enforcement agencies.

Narcotics data tracks the production, sale, and use of drugs like opium, morphine, and synthetic substances. It also records seizures of illegal consignments at international borders and clandestine movements within countries. Governments use this data to balance strict drug laws with medical needs, as well as to interdict drug trafficking.

Data sovereignty gives a country total control over the digital data generated by its citizens, as well as various government and private agencies. It acts as a digital border, preventing foreign nations or tech giants from accessing and using sensitive health or crime information without prior permission. Law enforcement agencies deal with an enormous volume of investigative data generated daily through camera images, wiretap recordings, reports from anonymous hotlines, and feeds from domestic and international government agencies.

The intersection of narcotics and data sovereignty boils down to a global conflict: national security and legal frameworks versus digital privacy and borderless communication. Because drug cartels use encrypted networks and digital currencies to sell illicit goods, governments must balance the protection of personal data with the necessity of dismantling digital drug markets. To complicate matters further, legal restrictions present a significant hurdle. Privacy laws, court warrant requirements, and other administrative rules can complicate the exchange of information between agencies and departments, even when such exchange is essential for investigations to succeed.

Data sovereignty dictates that digital information is governed by the laws of the country where that data is physically stored or transmitted. Because the internet connects people across the globe, data often travels through many countries and jurisdictions before reaching its final destination. Yet, international agencies—like the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)—rely heavily on shared data to fight transnational illicit drug networks. Countries want to stop illegal drug trafficking while keeping citizen data private, a dual objective that increasingly requires data servers to be located physically within their own national borders.

National security considerations demand extreme confidentiality regarding this data. If another country’s enforcement or intelligence agencies access a nation’s crime or health records without permission, it inevitably triggers legal, security, and diplomatic tensions.

This conflict between narcotics enforcement and data privacy usually takes place on the Dark Web. Drug traffickers use hidden, encrypted websites to sell illegal drugs and evade local enforcement agencies, bypassing traditional monetary checks by using digital currencies. While investigators need access to private messages to catch these dealers, obtaining this data requires breaking through user privacy protections and navigating the digital data laws of foreign jurisdictions.

To address these digital frontiers, the Indian government has created a specialized “Special Task Force on Darknet and Cryptocurrency.” This group monitors the internet to track suspicious transactions and stop online drug trafficking. However, fighting digital drug trafficking requires seamless global teamwork. When an Indian enforcement agency needs data from a foreign tech company (such as a social media platform), it must navigate international laws and mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs). Extracting this digital evidence can be slow and complicated, giving drug dealers ample time to erase their digital tracks. Consequently, a breach of sovereignty often becomes a convenient legal defense for drug traffickers.

The original concept of sovereignty was famously described by the sixteenth-century political philosopher Jean Bodin, who defined it as “the absolute and perpetual power of a republic.” In today’s digital world, however, that absolute and perpetual power of the state is being eroded by profound technological advancements. While the advent of modern tech, such as artificial intelligence and cloud computing, is thoroughly transforming civilian life, it simultaneously creates immense dilemmas for national security. Such technological challenges compel us to revisit the concept of sovereignty, expanding and transforming it into cyber sovereignty.

The multidimensional, multimodal, and multifaceted nature of existing cyberspace demands a comprehensive overview of the security environment vis-à-vis cyber and data security. In simpler terms, cyber sovereignty refers to a nation-state’s efforts to control its segment of the internet and cyberspace in the same manner as it controls its physical borders.

Israeli scholar and cyber policy analyst Dr. Lev Topor, in his 2024 book Cyber Sovereignty: International Security, Mass Communication, and the Future of the Internet, highlights how, in the absence of external controls in cyberspace, countries constantly seek to establish what he terms “Sovereign Cyber Domains (SCDs).” These function as tightly controlled cyberspaces designed to protect overall national security.

The collection, processing, and storage of data play a decisive role in establishing these SCDs across the globe. Today, virtually every aspect of modern life is intertwined with data. As mathematician Clive Humby famously observed, “Data is the new oil.” Just like oil, data is also a weapon that can be used, subverted, and manipulated by adversaries if the opportunity arises.

Driven by the rise of 5G internet and the exponential growth of AI and Internet of Things (IoT) technologies, the global volume of data created, captured, consumed, and copied is estimated to reach 181 zettabytes (approximately 181 trillion gigabytes) by the end of 2025. This astronomical amount of data is nothing less than an arsenal of opportunities for both state and non-state actors. While non-state entities like Big Tech use this data to boost commercial performance, in the wrong hands, the manipulation and subversion of this data can lead to catastrophic national security crises. To prevent such eventualities, countries around the world are moving to regulate the collection and processing of data, particularly personal data. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a prime example of this regulatory push.

To formalize its own personal data protection and regulatory regime, the Government of India enacted the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act). Most recently, in January 2025, India’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) released the draft Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025, which chart out the functional framework for the Data Protection Board of India.

Collaboration with like-minded countries and organizations can lead to a comprehensive enhancement of the global data protection architecture, preventing the widespread misuse of data. On the cybersecurity front, to minimize the damage of potential threats from data leaks, a Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) must be rigorously maintained. Furthermore, due to the intertwined civil-military nature of data and cybersecurity, a cumulative, whole-of-government approach is paramount for safeguarding national security.

The evolving landscape of online drug trafficking presents unprecedented challenges to drug control, as highlighted by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) in its annual reports. The increased availability of illicit drugs on the internet, the exploitation of social media and online platforms by criminal groups, and the heightened risk of overdose deaths driven by the online availability of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids represent the core challenges of drug control in the digital era. Using social media, drug traffickers can advertise their products directly to massive, global audiences. Standard social media platforms are frequently exploited as localized marketplaces, making inappropriate and dangerous content easily accessible to children and adolescents.

“We can see that drug trafficking is not just carried out on the Dark Web. Legitimate e-commerce platforms are being exploited by criminals too. We encourage governments to work with the private sector and INCB projects to prevent and detect trafficking of drugs and other dangerous substances online,” noted Jallal Toufiq, President of the INCB.

Advanced encryption methods, anonymous browsing on the darknet, and cryptocurrencies are routinely deployed to evade detection, complicating the prosecution of online trafficking offenses. Offenders can easily migrate their operations to jurisdictions with laxer law enforcement, lighter sanctions, or countries from which they can safely evade extradition. The sheer scale of this online activity adds further complexity; in one notable case in France, law enforcement authorities intercepted and analyzed more than 120 million text messages from 60,000 mobile phones.

On June 2, 2026, the Supreme Court of India held that national sovereignty must take precedence over personal liberty when the two are in conflict, particularly in cases involving narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The court made these remarks while setting aside a Punjab and Haryana High Court order that had granted bail to an accused individual running a drug-trafficking network from inside a prison using smuggled mobile phones.

“Should there be any conflict between the sovereignty of the country and personal liberty, undoubtedly, the former shall prevail, particularly when a war is waged against the nation, be it in the form of supply of drugs, which vitally affects the national economy and the health of people,” ruled a bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh.

Ultimately, drug trafficking physically corrodes the borders and laws of nations, while a lack of data sovereignty allows foreign entities to extract digital assets without consent. Both phenomena represent a critical loss of control over a nation’s physical and digital existence.

To counter these threats, the INCB, through its Global Rapid Interdiction of Dangerous Substances (GRIDS) Programme, delivers specialized training to enforcement agencies on intelligence sharing, analysis, and open-source investigations. This training is designed to strengthen international responses to synthetic drugs and illicit trafficking. It aims to enhance operational cooperation among national border security, drug control, customs, and regulatory agencies by training them on the INCB’s proprietary systems: the Project Ion Incident Communication System (IONICS), GRIDS Intelligence HD, and the Scanning Novel Opioids Online Platform (SNOOP).

The GRIDS Programme operates under the INCB’s unique Article 35 (1961) treaty mandate. This mandate supports governments’ capabilities to rapidly exchange information on the trafficking, illicit manufacture, marketing, and sale of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS), synthetic opioids, fentanyl, and related precursor chemicals. It provides real-time communication tools and intelligence-development capabilities to actively disrupt the global distribution of these dangerous substances.

As a popular digital-age adage warns: “In both drug trafficking and data sovereignty, the most valuable rule is the exact same: never get high on your own supply. In data, that means do not trust your own Terms of Service.”

Article by Shree Kumar Menon

Former Director General
National Academy of Customs Indirect Taxes and Narcotics,
& Multi-Disciplinary School of Economic Intelligence India,
Fellow, James Martin Centre for Non – Proliferation Studies, USA.

Fellow, Centre for International Trade & Security, University of Georgia, USA 
AOTS Scholar, Japan

Former Trustee New Mangalore Port Trust, Karnataka

UNODC Consultant on Narcotics & Psychotropic Substances

Former Registrar, Yenepoya Deemed to be University

Former Head, CNPS, MAHE, Manipal.