In late January 2026, Indian security forces in Delhi went on high alert following intelligence warnings of a potential coordinated terrorist strike, codenamed “26-26,” planned for or around Republic Day on January 26. According to some Indian reports, the intended targets included the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, the Raghunath Temple in Jammu, along with other temples and urban centers.

Indian intelligence attributed the plot to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), executed through the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorist group. JeM had previously been linked to a deadly car bomb explosion near Delhi’s Red Fort in November 2025, which killed 15 people.

At the same time, certain Western governments appear to indirectly support Pakistan’s military leadership through ongoing diplomatic and economic engagement. For example, in October 2025, Pakistan and Poland agreed to boost their bilateral trade to $1 billion and signed two memoranda of understanding to strengthen ties between their foreign ministries and research institutions.

On January 20, 2026, India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar met with Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski in New Delhi for delegation-level discussions. During the talks, Jaishankar—referencing Sikorski’s past experience as a journalist covering Afghanistan in the 1980s—urged Poland to adopt zero tolerance for terrorism. He stated: “You are no stranger to our region and are more than familiar with the long-standing challenges of cross-border terrorism. I hope to discuss at this meeting some of your recent travels to the region. Poland should display zero tolerance for terrorism and not help fuel the terrorist infrastructure in our neighborhood.”

Despite international scrutiny, Pakistan persists in nurturing new terrorist entities and strengthening existing ones, often with apparent tacit acceptance from some Western powers. A key example is the Pakistan Markazi Muslim League (PMML), a registered political party formed in 2023 as the most recent political front for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a UN-designated terrorist organization under the UN’s ISIS and Al-Qaida Sanctions regime (Resolution 1267).

Based in Lahore, PMML advances an Islamist platform. It participated in the 2024 general elections by nominating over 200 candidates across the country, including high-profile figures in areas like Lahore and Karachi, though it won no seats. Leadership includes Talha Saeed (president and son of LeT founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, himself a UN-designated terrorist) and other figures from the LeT/Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) network. The party operates outreach wings such as student, youth, and women’s leagues.

Related groups include the Muslim Students League (MSL), an Islamist student organization expanding since 2023 to promote Islamic values, ideology, and Muslim identity in educational institutions across Pakistan. With a strong social media footprint and regional chapters (e.g., in Hyderabad, Islamabad, and Tando Allahyar), MSL is widely viewed as a front and recruitment tool for LeT, fitting into LeT’s strategy—alongside proxies like JuD, Milli Muslim League (MML), and PMML—to cultivate influence among youth in universities and colleges.

Similarly, the Muslim Women League (MWL) is an Islamist women’s group established in 2023 as part of LeT’s network expansion. It emphasizes Islamic values, women’s empowerment via religious principles, ideological indoctrination, and community activities targeted at women. Operating alongside affiliated entities like the Muslim Student League, Muslim Youth League, Muslim Girls League, and Muslim Kids League, MWL uses social media and local events for outreach and is regarded as another LeT front and recruitment arm.

The Resistance Front (TRF), which gained prominence since emerging in 2019–2020 in Jammu and Kashmir, serves as a rebranded proxy for LeT. It was positioned as a “local, secular resistance” group to conceal its Islamist origins and sidestep global scrutiny amid Pakistan’s pressures from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). India has designated TRF as a terrorist organization, and in 2025, the United States classified it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity, confirming it as a LeT front and proxy. This aligned with longstanding intelligence indicating TRF’s role in LeT’s evolving infrastructure.

TRF has claimed multiple targeted killings, grenade attacks, and ambushes in Jammu and Kashmir, often focusing on minority civilians, migrant workers, political activists, and security forces. It has been associated with strikes against Kashmiri Pandits (Hindus) and non-local laborers in 2021–2022, employing demographic intimidation and psychological terror rather than mass-casualty operations. Messaging from groups like PAFF (often linked) spreads via encrypted channels and social media with concise, stylized statements amplified by sympathetic or unvetted online accounts. These target not only locals but also international journalists, NGOs, digital activists, and diaspora communities, using “anti-fascist” framing to obscure ties to LeT. This reflects a shift toward hybrid information warfare, where narrative control rivals kinetic actions.

Another emerging terrorist front, the Kashmir Fighters, appeared in 2023–2024 in Jammu and Kashmir, mainly through online claims rather than visible on-ground structure. Its rise fits a pattern of proxy recycling, introducing temporary names to perpetuate terrorism while evading attribution to sanctioned groups—a tactic seen in TRF and People’s Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF). This approach responds to international demands on Pakistan to curb terrorist financing and dismantle visible infrastructure.

The extent of ISI involvement in supporting these groups is deeply concerning. According to the European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS), Pakistan funds such organizations substantially, with ISI’s annual expenditure estimated at $125–250 million, covering salaries, incentives for high-risk missions, and payments to guides, porters, and informers.

Beyond funding and training, the ISI has reshaped the Kashmir conflict by framing it as a Pan-Islamic religious struggle led by foreign terrorists. Pakistan differentiates between “bad” terrorists (those attacking Pakistani forces) and “good” terrorists (those serving its strategic aims against Afghanistan, India, and Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir), enabling groups that pursue territorial gains, ethnic cleansing, and regional Islamization.

Western societies, media, and governments often exhibit shortsightedness regarding jihadist terrorism in Pakistan and beyond. Many fail to fully recognize or confront its ideological and religious drivers, instead viewing it through limited prisms like policy grievances or isolated events. This contributes to ineffective counter-terrorism approaches and may inadvertently bolster entities like Pakistan that foster such groups.